Recently, Manolo Martínez presented his “A Solution for the Indeterminacy Problem.” I voiced a worry I had some time ago, according to which indeterminacy will be just a fact if whatever it is in the individual that determines reference, fails to determine a particular one within a range of equally natural candidates.
In the discussion with Sònia Roca, however, it seemed to me that he would agree with this but contend that, in a given range of cases in the discussion, one of the candidates was indeed more natural than the alternatives. So reconstructed, the paper will advance a particular elaboration on the relevant notion of naturalness via HPCs as to substantiate the contention. Is this a fair reconstruction?
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I think that the indeterminacy problem is a problem of content ascription.
In the famous frog example, the frog mechanism for detecting flies would systematically be activated whenever it is in front of a black speck.
If the content of a mental state were for example the property indicated,or the property the frog's eyes react to then the mental state would indicate too many things. So, what is the content of the mental state?
Naturalistic theories of content try to explain in virtue of what a certain mental state is about something else and what is it about.
The content of the mental state will depend on the theory. We would reject a theory that predict that the content of the mental state of the frog is 'non-poison, nutritive, free of enemies meal'. 'Fly' instead is a more "natural" content ascription than the former.
Manolo tried to show precisely that this mental states are about HPCs, why and that HPCs are quite satisfactory ('natural') for being ascribed as content. That is at least what I have understood.
I think Dan is right that:
"indeterminacy will be just a fact if whatever it is in the individual that determines reference, fails to determine a particular one within a range of equally natural candidates."
It all depends on how we interpret this "whatever it is in the individual". If it is supposed to be a disposition, or something like that, then I have to disagree. But we can interpret it as meaning just "whatever it is that determines reference" (within or without the individual).
I think what I tried to show is that "whatever it is that determines reference" does pick out one single candidate. This is so because what determines the reference of the positives of a mental mechanism M is the following, complicated fact:
M has the function to indicate the presence of Fi, for a number i of properties, and the emergence of this function has been enabled by the presence of a HPC, say, F.
The reference of M is, then, F.
I do not think naturalness plays any obvious role in this story. Rather, the theory has as a consequence that the content to be ascribed to the mental states of frogs involves flies, rather than, as Sebas puts it, "non-poisonous, nutritive, blah blah, flies". We find such the former attribution more natural than the latter, so our intuitions of naturalness provide evidence for the theory, but the theory does not rely on them. Or so I think.
What if there are two coextensive HPCs, say F-1 and F-2? M is indeterminate in reference between the two?
I guess. But I cannot think of any simple examples.
If what you have in mind is simply redescriptions of the same HPC (say "flies" vs. "things of *that* kind,) then the account does not distinguish between the two. But that's OK. Content attributions at this extremely basic level are de re through and through.
That's why I thought that there being an HPC was an elaboration of the idea of there being a property natural enough as to serve as reference magnet.
In any case, you are right that even so reconstructed the paper does not only advance a particular elaboration on the relevant notion of naturalness via HPCs as to substantiate the contention, but also a substantive proposal about what it is (in the individual) that determines reference.
BTW I take it that holding that the relevant referents are HPCs is your favored metaphysical view on that, but how much of your proposal essentially depends on this? If someone just believed in a fundamental distinction between natural (enough) properties and the rest, could she still adapt your proposal, and say that what determines the reference of the positives of a mental mechanism M is the following?
M has the function to indicate the presence of Fi, for a number i of properties, and the emergence of this function has been enabled by the presence of a natural (enough) property, say, F. The reference of M is, then, F.
I guess I should just read your stuff, sorry ;-)!
Yep, the thing is: I can see how this enabling can be done by HPCs; for other "natural properties", we should see.
At any rate, I think we need what one could call an induction-structure: a cluster of properties that are frequently coinstantiated and a reason why they so corecur. The bare-bones version of this requisite is the HPC but, I think, traditional-essence natural kinds could also do the trick: water, e. g., is also such that a number of properties (transparent, liquid, hydrating, etc.) go together for a reason.
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