tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-374749932024-03-07T06:50:50.307+01:00The bLOGOSThis is the blog of LOGOS—Logic, Language and Cognition Research Group.Dan López de Sahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16716694655307652854noreply@blogger.comBlogger61125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-37474993.post-4896134448431474732010-11-13T16:33:00.000+01:002010-11-13T16:34:12.252+01:00We have moved!Go check the new bLOGOS <a href="http://www.theblogos.net">here</a>!Manolo Martínezhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09403052618689090551noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-37474993.post-28766794500533934882010-10-21T19:33:00.002+02:002010-10-21T19:39:15.427+02:00On Properties of Sets of PropertiesIf I understood it right, part of the core of <a href="http://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/colloquium_card.php?idSem=628">Zalta's LOGOS Colloquium</a> today was the thesis that his abstract objects were not mere sets of properties. I wasn't completely clear about exactly his reasons for this, but he mentioned the contention that sets can not exemplify any of its members. Apologies in advance if I am missing something basic, but is this really so? Take P to be the property of being a set mentioned at The bLOGOS and consider its singleton. Isn't it both the case that P is a member of {P} and that {P} exemplifies P? No?Dan López de Sahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16716694655307652854noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-37474993.post-3126681894072428772010-04-05T00:48:00.000+02:002010-04-05T12:30:22.881+02:00Are King's propositions too fine-grained?Jeffrey King is well-known for his account of propositions as worldly entities, as facts consisting of objects, properties and relations. The fact that King claims <span style="FONT-STYLE: italic">is</span> a propositions is of the following sort: there is a language containing some expressions that stand in certain sentential relations (basically, the way they got syntactically combined) , with each expression having as semantic value an object, a property or a relation. (This is the basic set-up, he adds more bells and whistles on top of that.) One main advantage of King's view is the ability to solve a major problem for unstructured views of propositions (especially for the propositions-as-possible-worlds view): namely, accounting for necessary truths (or falsehoods) in a way that doesn't make them all equivalent. Since King's propositions inherit their structures from the sentential relations that bind together the words in the sentences expressing those propositions, each proposition (including necessary ones) will have a different structure, closely related to the sentence used to express it. A related problem that is nicely solved in King's framework are the different puzzles arising from embeddings under propositional attitude verbs: for example, the propositions expressed by the sentences "Annie ran 20 kilometres" and "Annie run 12.43 miles" are different, and that accounts for Bill's (who's ignorant about lenght measures) believing one and not the other. It thus seems that on King's account propositions have enought structure as to count as different when we want them to count as such.<br />This is all nice and good. The question now is: doesn't this positive feature of King's view turn on closer inspection into a negative one? For, as it has been pointed out, it could be that now propositions are too fine-grained. For King claims that not only the propositions expressed by "Annie ran 20 kilometres" and "Annie ran 12.43 miles" are different (which might be easier to accept), but also, for example, that the propositions expressed by the sentences "1=2" and "2=1" are different. This might very well strike some as being utterly counterintuitive.<br />King is aware of the counterintuitiveness of his claim, and therefore tries to alleviate the worry. To this effect, he asks the reader to compare the propositions expressed by the sentences above with those expressed by the following ones: "1<2" and "2<1". Do these sentences express different propositions? They clearly do. But notice now that what makes the latter sentences express different propositions is just the different order of their constituents. But if that's the case, why shouldn't we accept that "1=2" and "2=1" also express different propositions? Our reluctance to do so is traced down by King to one peculiar feature of the relation that the equality sign stands for: namely, its transitivity. It's true that equality is transitive, King says, but that is just a feature of that particular relation, and it shouldn't bear on the issue whether the same propositions is expressed or not by sentences that differ only in the order of their constituents. I find the explanation involving the peculiaity of equality convincing, but I also understand that one could still feel that one's intuitions about the identity of propositions have not being attended to. To be sure, King has a shot at dispensing with those intuitions; usual motives are invoked - their unreliability, them tracing other kinds of content than propositional content, etc. But this seems to me problematic, at least for the following reason: if King has to give up intuitions at some point, the defendant of the unstructured propositions view could do the same. The set of intuitions given up by each camp will be different, of course, but what becomes unclear is whether King can still claim the advantage he thinks his view has over the unstructured propositions view. So, the questions to be answered are: Do you believe that King has a problem here - are his propositions too fine-grained? Do you find his explanation in the case of the propositions expressed by "1=2" and "2=1" correct? What do you think about his dismissal of (some) intuitions? [This post is a late semi-transcription of a discussion that took place at a reading group in Paris, and the points raised here were originally raised by Michael Murez and Adrian Briciu.]Dan Zemanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02853927138627550301noreply@blogger.com13tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-37474993.post-57123148893710700812009-11-19T08:01:00.002+01:002009-11-19T08:14:49.737+01:00Philo-Surveys<div class="post">Around in the web:<br /><ul><li><a href="https://www.surveymonkey.com/s.aspx?sm=u_2fmW1lVR2ZyszkTSH2Jnzw_3d_3d">A survey</a> on philosophers’ views about normative judgments.</li><li><a href="http://www.surveymonkey.com/s.aspx?sm=TXA9uBYCaq4MtU_2bwLhLADQ_3d_3d">A survey</a> on publishing in philosophy.</li><li><a href="http://www.abdn.ac.uk/philosophy/nip/journal/survey.php">A survey</a> on a new journal in philosophy.</li></ul>Plus, if you're a <a href="http://philpapers.org/">PhilPapers</a> user, a survey on the distribution of philosophical views among professional philosophers and others (in your inbox).</div>Dan López de Sahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16716694655307652854noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-37474993.post-52748418062263653822009-11-11T12:42:00.003+01:002009-11-11T15:19:31.664+01:00Easy “Difference-Making” Properties?Last week <a href="http://www.ub.es/grc_logos/reading_group_card.php?id=117">we </a>discussed Cameron’s '<a href="http://www.personal.leeds.ac.uk/%7Ephlrpc/Truthmaking%20for%20presentists.pdf">Truthmaking for Presentists</a>,' very cool paper!<br /><br />Bracketing concerns about a notion of indeterminacy whose source is not semantic (nor epistemic) and about the notion of indeterminate truth, we devoted part of the discussion to Cameron’s contention that insatisfaction with “Lucretian” properties like being such as to have been a child motivates restriction to <span style="font-style: italic;">difference-making properties</span> as candidates for truthmaking, understood as properties “the instantiation of which at a time makes a difference to the intrinsic nature of the bearer at that time”.<br /><br />If I understood them correctly, both Marta Campdelacreu (in attendance) and Pablo Rychter (virtually) independently worried that some properties that would count as difference-making for Cameron seemed insatisfactory for truthmaking in just the same way than “Lucretian” properties were. Take an intrinsic property Ross presently instantiates, say being currently sitting. It would seem as unsatisfactory as before that the presentist used the property of being such as to have been a child and currently sitting in the truthmaker for the truth that Ross was a child. But the property <span style="font-style: italic;">is </span>difference-making for him, given that<br /><blockquote>(*) Ross has the intrinsic nature at the present that he has partly in virtue of instantiating being such as to have been a child and currently sitting at the present.</blockquote>(Notice that it won’t do, it seems to me, to reject (*) on the basis of:<br /><blockquote>(#) Ross has the intrinsic nature at the present that he has partly in virtue of instantiating being currently sitting at the present.</blockquote>For, arguably, if (#) is true then (*) is <span style="font-style: italic;">also </span>true. See the axiom of <span style="font-style: italic;">subsumption </span>in Fine’s (<a href="http://www.springerlink.com/content/g18p5h022u60k01n/">1995</a>) logic of essence, and the discussion of the <span style="font-style: italic;">conjunction thesis</span> for truthmaking in López de Sa (<a href="http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/118/470/417">2009</a>).)Dan López de Sahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16716694655307652854noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-37474993.post-43884051225890042572009-10-27T18:02:00.005+01:002009-10-27T21:43:19.893+01:00Schaffer's PermissivismA couple of weeks ago <a href="http://www.ub.es/grc_logos/reading_group_card.php?id=117">we</a> discussed Schaffer's '<a href="http://rsss.anu.edu.au/%7Eschaffer/papers/Ground.pdf" target="_blank">On What Grounds What</a>'. Although we discussed quite a bit about different, non-equivalent ways of characterizing 'permissivism' in detail, I got the sense that there was a general sympathy towards the spirit of the contention that existential questions about numbers etc. were somehow easy, and the harder questions concerned what grounds what, and thus what is fundamental.<br /><br />In particular, those in attendance did not object to the following constituting a proof of the existence of numbers (p. 357):<br /><ol><li>There are prime numbers.</li><li>Therefore there are numbers.</li></ol>This is just an invitation to people not in attendance to share their views ;-).Dan López de Sahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16716694655307652854noreply@blogger.com7tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-37474993.post-17857947476784326282009-10-27T15:31:00.002+01:002009-10-27T15:43:59.458+01:00Lasersohn as a Truth Relativist, MacFarlane styleI remember there was a discussion at some point between Dan LdS and Manolo CG about whether Lasersohn is a "non-indexical contextualist" or a "relativist" (MacFarlane's terms). The discussion concerned Lasersohn's 2005 paper, "Context dependence, disagreement and predicates of personal taste", where, with the exception of a short paragraph whose interpretation sparked the debate, there is nothing to base a relativist interpretation on ("relativist" - mind you - as opposed to "non-indexical contextualist"; there's no question whether Lasersohn is a contextualist of the ordinary sort.) However, in his more recent paper, which we were supposed to read in our unofficial reading group on contextualism and relativism last year, things are crystal clear. Here is what Lasersohn says in "Quantification and perspective in relativist semantics", Philosophical Perspectives 2008:<br /><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-size:85%;">What makes this system “relativist”? Different authors use this term in</span><br /><span style="font-size:85%;">different ways. As I understand it, there are two crucial features of the system</span><br /><span style="font-size:85%;">just outlined which make this term appropriate. First, sentences may vary in</span><br /><span style="font-size:85%;">truth value without a corresponding variation in content. Second, this variation</span><br /><span style="font-size:85%;">depends on some parameter whose value is not fixed by the situation in which a</span><br /><span style="font-size:85%;">sentence is used. (pg. 315)</span><br />And then he continues, relating his view with MacFarlane's:<br /><span style="font-size:85%;">These criteria are equivalent, as far as I can tell, to the claim that sentences<br />may be assigned contents whose truth values depend not just on the “context<br />of use” but also on the “context of assessment” (MacFarlane 2003, 2005a). We<br />treat the context of use as fully determined by the situation in which the sentence<br />is used; if truth values vary independently of this situation, we regard them as<br />at least partly dependent on a separate context determined by the situation in<br />which the sentence is assessed for truth or falsity.<br /></span></div>Maybe the debate was solved months ago, but I thought I should mention it anyway!Dan Zemanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02853927138627550301noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-37474993.post-38084057236241270562009-10-15T15:57:00.004+02:002009-10-15T16:42:08.439+02:00Kaplan and the shotgunThis is a non-serious post connected to Dan LdS's talk on Wednesday (which I suppose took place...). To be more precise, it's conencted to Egan's paper that Dan was considering. I haven't re-read the paper, but I remember I wasn't convinced that the Kaplanian framework has serious problems with (at least some of) the examples Egan is giving. Also, it struck me as a bad thinig that Egan doesn't think it necessary to sharply differentiate his view from the multiple-utterances view. If I remember correctly, Egan's preferred view is that an utterance produced at a given context of utterance expresses a multiplicity of propositions, which proposition is expressed being determined by the context of utterance <span style="font-style: italic;">together with </span>the context of assessment (don't remember whether he actually uses this latter term, but let's stick to it for the moment). On the other hand, the multiple-utterances view has it that each time different assessors are presented with a sentence produced in a context of utterance (different from the respective contexts of assesment), that counts as a different utterance of the sentence at issue. [Let me here note that even the shotgun metaphor that Egan uses is closer to the multiple-utterances view than to his preferred one: the shotgun is the producing of the sounds, the bullets are the different utterances and the wounded people are the different propositions expressed. (Yes, this is Romanian mafia speaking. Shhhh...)] Now, the thing is I'm not sure Kaplan has problems with the multiple-utterances view. In defining truth in a context, Kaplan speaks of <span style="font-style: italic;">occurences </span>of sentences. Could these be equated with utterances? If not, is the relation between occurences and utterances such that an occurence of a sentence can <span style="font-style: italic;">only</span> result in one utterance being produced? My "I'll be back in 5 minutes" post on my office door constitutes, I take it, just one occurence of the sentence. Yet, it seems to me to spread around a multiplicity of utterances - one for each different minute (second?) the note spends hung on my door. Of course, to get across a content, someone needs to read the note, so that that someone grasps the proposition, but I don't think it's so implausible that there are propositions out there that no one grasps :-) (This is similar to the gravestone poem example, right? What does Egan say about that - how does he reject it? Sorry for being lazy...) So maybe Kaplan's talk of occurences gets things wrong, but defining truth for utterances instead of truth for occurences would fix it - in such a way that the multiple-utterances view is compatible with the "modified" Kaplan. Even if one finds ungrasped propositions hard to swallow, each grasped proposition gets expressed in a context in which there is both a "speaker" and an audience, located in time and space, which seems to me to be the notion of context Kaplan is using.<br />If you find this too confusing or stupid, please ignore it. :-)Dan Zemanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02853927138627550301noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-37474993.post-19894456807857739622009-10-09T18:26:00.004+02:002009-10-09T22:10:19.026+02:00Epistemological NightmareAll our worries were justified: Two "Zebras" in a zoo in Gaza turned out to be cleverly painted mules:<br /><a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8297812.stm">http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8297812.stm</a><br />The UN are sending in a hastily assembled squadron of epistemologists to keep the situation from escalating.Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-37474993.post-32832539936540456782009-10-08T11:53:00.006+02:002009-10-13T19:09:22.545+02:00Anti-Extensionalists?We have had the first session of the new <a href="http://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/reading_group_card.php?id=117">LOGOS Reading Group on Metaphysics</a>. We discussed Varzi’s recent ‘<a href="http://www.columbia.edu/%7Eav72/papers/Analysis_2009.pdf">Universalism Entails Extensionalism</a>' in <span style="font-style: italic;">Analysis</span>. I was quite surprised to learn about the difference between characterizing a <span style="font-style: italic;">sum</span> of the Xs as<br /><blockquote>something that overlaps all and only those things that overlap some of the Xs</blockquote>vs<br /><blockquote>something that has the Xs as parts and no part disjoint from the Xs.</blockquote><br />We also resumed a discussion we had <a href="http://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/reading_group_card.php?id=66">last year</a> about who should count as <span style="font-style: italic;">anti-extensionalist</span>, allowing that there be two non-atomic things sharing all proper parts. Varzi mentions Wiggins 1980, but as <a href="http://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/member_card.php?id=122">Marta </a>Campdelacreu pointed out, for a Wigginsian arguably the head of the cat is part of it, but not of a ‘mere’ fusion of its body cells, right? Any other candidates?Dan López de Sahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16716694655307652854noreply@blogger.com4tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-37474993.post-72487278480221096292009-10-02T16:35:00.002+02:002009-10-02T17:32:09.184+02:00Illocutions, Perlocutions and Metaphorical ContentIn his talk last Wednesday at the LOGOS Seminar, "On Metaphorical Content", Gergö Somodi gave an argument that puts pressure on anti-Davidsonian theories of metaphorical content, and suggested a possible way out, to be further researched and elaborated. Here I will present my interpretation of the paper, and I will indicate that, if I understood it correctly, the research project is indeed worth pursuing.<br /><br />Following more or less the Austinian terminology that Gergö was using, and more or less the interpretation of Davidsonian views he was assuming, on a Davidsonian view the only illocution made with an utterance of a metaphorical sentence such as 'Juliet is the Sun' is the one whose content is the literal necessary falsehood that Juliet is identical with our star. It is true that the utterance conveys to audiences other, more sensible ideas, such as the claim that Juliet gives warm and light to the speaker; but this is no illocution, it is only a causal effect of the literal illocution on which the latter has as little rational influence as if that idea had been produced in the audience by "a bump in the head" (Davidson, <span style="font-style: italic;">sic</span>). On a Davidsonian account, then, grasping that Juliet gives warm and light to the speaker is merely a <span style="font-weight: bold;">perlocutionary</span> effect.<br /><br />Anti-Davidsonians like Elizabeth Camp argue instead that the more sensible idea is also an illocution (in addition perhaps to the illocution of the literal meaning) of the utterance, perhaps conveyed in the indirect way that indirect speech acts or conversational implicatures are conveyed, or perhaps more in the way that context-dependent meanings are conveyed. Now, the problem that Gergö raised for these views (as Genoveva helped me to appreciate) goes as follows: writers like Camp accept that an essential part of the mechanism through which the alleged metaphorical illocution is conveyed to audiences has audiences "noticing resemblances, seeing things, entertaining pictures"; but all of these are <span style="font-style: italic;">perlocutionary</span> effects; how can an illocution be conveyed by essential perlocutionary means?<br /><br />My initial resistance to this way of setting the problem was as follows: if perlocutions are defined the way Gergö proposed (intention-irrelevant causal effects of utterances), then it is not clear that the categories illocution/perlocution are incompatible. For understanding the literal semantic content of a context-dependent utterance, such as Kaplan's 'That is a <em>picture of the greatest philosopher</em> of the twentieth <em>century</em>.', might well be an intention-irrelevant (in the sense indicated by Gergö) causal effect of an utterance. But then the anti-Davidsonian is safe, because "noticing resemblances, seeing things, entertaining pictures" might be perlocutions <span style="font-weight: bold;">but also illocutions</span>, and there is no problem with the view. This would be clearer if we used a less question-begging description of the way we interpret metaphors, such as, in our example, "thinking of the target-domain of persons in terms of the commonly believed properties of the source-domain of stars", instead of speaking of "noticing, seeing, picturing".<br /><br />Alternatively, we can define "perlocution" in such a way that the categories of illocutions and perlocutions are really incompatible, as on the Strawsonian definition that what is distinctive of perlocutions is that they cannot be produced by Gricean communicative intentions. But then it is question-begging to say that the way we interpret metaphors, through "noticing resemblances, seeing things, entertaining pictures", is a perlocution. The anti-Davidsonian would say that this is no perlocution, in the Strawsonian sense, but rather something that can indeed be achieved by means of communicative intentions, what, again, would be clearer if we described it in less question-begging terms such as "thinking of the target-domain of persons in terms of the commonly believed properties of the source-domain of stars".<br /><br />In the course of the discussion (particularly the exchange with Josep), I came to think that this is also what Gergö wants to suggest, and that his point was rather that defending it requires a better clarification of what is usually meant by <span style="font-style: italic;">perlocution</span>, so that we can see that effects that in some sense can be called 'perlocutionary' can contribute to properly illocutionary effects. With this I agree, in fact Gergö's characterization of a <span style="font-style: italic;">perlocution</span> as an intentionally-irrelevant causal effect of an utterance is what many writers on these topics seem to have in mind (see for instance chapter 2 of Alston's <span style="font-style: italic;">Illocutionary Acts and Sentence-Meaning</span>).m g-chttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09291599601885624567noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-37474993.post-19133213628433424492009-08-06T22:39:00.002+02:002009-08-06T22:42:51.547+02:00On the distinction between positive and negative conceivability in ChalmersI'm sorry but the following was written in Spanish, if anyone has trouble reading and is interested I can translate.<br /><br /> <div class="Section1"><p style="margin-left: 0pt; margin-right: 0pt; font-family: arial;"><span style="font-size:85%;">Sobre la distinción entre concebibilidad positiva y negativa en Chalmers:</span></p><p style="margin-left: 0pt; margin-right: 0pt; font-family: arial;"><span style="font-size:85%;"> </span></p><p style="margin-left: 0pt; margin-right: 0pt; font-family: arial;"><span style="font-size:85%;">Según Chalmers, la concebibilidad positiva tiene las siguientes ventajas epistemológicas sobre la negativa:</span></p><ol style="font-family: arial;" type="1"><li><span style="font-size:85%;">“se corresponde con el tipo de intuición modal clara y distinta invocada por Descartes y que refleja la práctica en el método de concebibilidad como es usado en los experimentos mentales filosóficos contemporáneos” (155)</span></li><li><span style="font-size:85%;">la concebibilidad positiva es mejor guía para la posibilidad que la negativa (160)</span></li></ol><p style="margin-left: 0pt; margin-right: 0pt; font-family: arial;"><span style="font-size:85%;"> </span></p><p style="margin-left: 0pt; margin-right: 0pt; font-family: arial;"><span style="font-size:85%;">Ambas resultan de su concepción de la misma más o menos en los términos de Yablo (1993): </span></p><ul style="font-family: arial;" type="disc"><ul type="disc"><li><span style="font-size:85%;">concebir positivamente consiste en “imaginar (en algún sentido) una configuración específica de objetos y propiedades” (150)</span></li><li><span style="font-size:85%;">se diferencia de suponer o “entertain</span><span style="font-size:85%;">ing</span><span style="font-size:85%;">” porque (al igual que la imaginación perceptiva)</span><span style="font-size:85%;"> el acto de imaginar que S tiene un carácter objetual mediado: consiste en tener “una intuición de (o como de) un <i>mundo</i></span><span style="font-size:85%;"> en el que S, o por lo menos de (o como de) una situación en la que S, donde una situación es (a grandes rasgos) una configuración de objetos y propiedades dentro de un mundo” (151)</span></li></ul></ul><p style="margin-left: 0pt; margin-right: 0pt; font-family: arial;"><span style="font-size:85%;"> </span></p><p style="margin-left: 0pt; margin-right: 0pt; font-family: arial;"><span style="font-size:85%;">A diferencia de Yablo, imposibilidades manifiestas pueden ser imaginadas en este sentido según Chalmers y por ello agrega que la imaginación debe ser coherente (152-3).</span></p><p style="margin-left: 0pt; margin-right: 0pt; font-family: arial;"><span style="font-size:85%;">La pregunta a hacer es ¿en qué consiste esa “intuición” de un mundo/situación en el caso de la imaginación modal? Está claro que en el caso perceptivo sería algo que podemos llamar una “imagen mental” de la misma. Lo único que se me ocurre es que en el caso modal en lugar de visualizar/construir una imagen, lo que hacemos es captar/construir una descripción del mundo/situación en cuestión. Siguiendo a Chalmers, imaginar modalmente (visualmente no se puede) que Alemania gana la II Guerra Mundial consiste en "imaginar un mundo donde Alemania gana ciertas batallas y procede a abrumar a las fuerzas aliadas dentro de Europa! (151). Esto es, uno debe describir el mundo imaginado en algunos aspectos adicionales pero relevantes a la verdad de la proposición involucrada. Por ejemplo, Si deseo imaginar un mundo donde los cerdos vuelan debo imaginar algunos rasgos biológicos de los seres voladores que me permitan afirmar que son cerdos (¿rasgos morfológicos tal vez? ¿genéticos?) y algún detalle acerca de cómo animales así logran volar. Cuanto más detallada la descripción del mundo (cuanta más información contenga), más "positiva" habrá sido la concepción. De este modo el requisito de coherencia puede ser también más fácilmente comprendido: la descripción debe ser consistente. <br /></span></p><p style="margin-left: 0pt; margin-right: 0pt; font-family: arial;"><span style="font-size:85%;">Si esta reconstrucción está encaminada, la diferencia entre concebibilidad negativa y positiva de una oración S consiste en la diferencia entre que S no sea falsa a priori y que una descripción D relevante de un mundo-S sea consistente.</span></p><p style="margin-left: 0pt; margin-right: 0pt;"><span style="font-size:85%;"><span style="font-family: arial;">Aquí surge una segunda pregunta: ¿qué tipo de información relevante para la verdad de S debemos considerar? Supongamos un conjunto de tales oraciones O<sub>1</sub>...O<sub>n</sub> que son condiciones necesarias de S. Ahora bien, para toda Oi el condicional Oi entonces S es verdadero, pero en algunos casos es conocido a priori y en otros a posteriori. Cuando caracteriza la concebibilidad primaria (1-concebibilidad) afirma que "es siempre un asunto a priori" e involucra suspender todo conocimiento a posteriori (158). ¿Significa esto que las únicas Oi relevantes para 1-concebir positivamente un mundo-S son aquellas en las que el condicional es a priori? No entiendo muy bien en ese caso cómo podríamos 1-concebir positivamente que algunos cerdos vuelan. Tal parece que tenemos que examinar qué es lo que sabemos a priori de los cerdos, por ejemplo, que son animales de cuatro patas, tal vez. Pero parece que hay poco que sepamos de este modo y no alcanza para construir una descripción que determine un mundo-S. Si este diagnóstico es correcto resultará que a estos efectos es tan difícil concebir positivamente que algunos cerdos vuelan como un enunciado matemático complejo. En otras palabras, se repite contra la concebibilidad positiva de Chalmers la objeción de van Inwagen a la concebibilidad a la Yablo. ¿Qué opinan?</span></span><br /></p></div>Luishttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12705719877238252760noreply@blogger.com3tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-37474993.post-22954586487018076232009-07-13T08:56:00.010+02:002009-07-13T09:53:49.005+02:00Do you think that there is anything it is like to have a visual experience in general?There are different shades of red that you can experience. You can distinguish between RED35 and RED36, two experiences of different shades of red. Both experiences of the two shades of red are more similar, phenomenologically speaking, between them that with regard to RED2.<br />Furthermore experiences RED35, RED36 and RED2 seem to be more similar that an experience of GREEN21. In general we distinguish between red experiences and green experiences. The phenomenal properties that characterize red experiences are in a sense different from those which characterize green experiences.<br />Do you think that it is controversial to suppose that red experiences have something phenomenological in common?<br /><br />The former four experiences are in a sense similar, they are color experiences. They differ in a sense from visual experiences of forms, like a visual experience of a square. But again this experience and an experience of a red object have something in common: they are visual experiences, and in a sense the way they <span style="font-weight: bold;">feel</span> is similar.<br />Do you agree that visual experiences <span style="font-weight: bold;">feel</span> somehow similar and that the way that they <span style="font-weight: bold;">feel</span> is different from, say, auditory experiences?<br /><p></p>Sebashttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12920155887988013802noreply@blogger.com5tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-37474993.post-26957624824990467612009-07-07T13:30:00.004+02:002009-07-07T13:50:35.611+02:00Indeterminacy Problem or Fact?<a href="http://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/conferences/PROGRAMME.pdf">Recently</a>, <a href="http://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/people/martinez_merino/index.htm">Manolo</a> Martínez presented his “A Solution for the Indeterminacy Problem.” I voiced a worry <a href="http://blogblogos.blogspot.com/2007/11/teleology-and-indeterminacy.html">I had some time ago</a>, according to which indeterminacy will be just a fact if whatever it is in the individual that determines reference, fails to determine a particular one within a range of equally natural candidates.<br /><br />In the discussion with <a href="http://www.sonia-rocaroyes.net/index.php">Sònia</a> Roca, however, it seemed to me that he would agree with this but contend that, in a given range of cases in the discussion, one of the candidates was indeed more natural than the alternatives. So reconstructed, the paper will advance a particular elaboration on the relevant notion of naturalness via HPCs as to substantiate the contention. Is this a fair reconstruction?Dan López de Sahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16716694655307652854noreply@blogger.com7tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-37474993.post-29884526843510356002009-07-07T06:29:00.004+02:002009-07-07T09:36:10.767+02:00Phenomenal Properties and Epistemic AccessPhenomenal properties are properties of mental states. In virtue of a phenomenal property a certain mental state <span style="font-weight: bold;">feels</span> somehow, there is something it is like to be in that mental state.<br />Some philosophers have argued that a mental state M of a subject S can instantiate a phenomenal property P without S realizing (or even being able to realize) that she is feeling anything (phenomenal consciousness without access consciousness in Block's terminology).<br />I disagree. There is a sense of feeling, that is the sense I am interested in, in which it makes no sense to talk about feeling anything if one does not realize it. In that sense, phenomenal consciousness entails access consciousness.<br />If we are interested in phenomenal properties and in its naturalization, the discussion is relevant. For imagine that one is interested in a neural correlate of a conscious mental state, or in some empirical evidences relevant for certain theories of consciousness. Is the epistemic access a constitutive part of the phenomenal property?<br />For instance, blindsighters have been sometimes presented as an objection to representational theories of consciousness. In order to deal with this, representational theorists introduce some further condition for instantiating a phenomenal property besides the representational character (for instance Tye introduces the condition of being available for reasoning and believes -being "poised" in Tye's terminology). But if we accept the distinction between the phenomenal property and the epistemic access, we can say that what is missing in the case of the blidsighter is the epistemic access (poised would not be a necessary condition for consciousness). In that case, I see no pre-theoretical way to decide whether or not a phenomenal property is instantiated.<br />A further problem would be that, if the process responsible for the instantiation of the phenomenal property and the epistemic access are different, one could fail. Imagine that S is instantiating phenomenal property A, the epistemic access machinery fails (certain neurons misfire) and indicates phenomenal property B. What does S feel? Trilemma:<br /><ol><li>S feels anything. But this seems to be an ad hoc answer </li><li>S feels B. In this case the phenomenal property instantiated plays no role in what S is feeling.</li><li>S feels A. In this case S feels A but if she has a believe about what she is feeling this is going to be false. This option seems to go against the widespread intuition that we do have direct access and knowledge of what we are feeling<br /></li></ol>Option 3 seems not to be acceptable for me. One can fail in categorizing the feeling: for example having a experience A of very cold water and believing that it is really hot. In such a case there is a categorization mistake: experience A is categorized as belonging to experiences of hot water. Nevertheless, it seems to me that I am infallible in knowing what it is like to have experience A when I am undergoing experience A (some kind of indexical knowledge, this feeling)<br />It seems to me that in virtue of instantiating a phenomenal property I thereby come to know what it is like to undergo the corresponding experience (maybe I cannot remember it 1 msec. later). If this is true, the epistemic access is an intrinsic element of the phenomenal property and there cannot be phenomenal consciousness without access consciouness.<br /><br />What do you think about the relation between phenomenal properties and the epistemic access?<br />ThanksSebashttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12920155887988013802noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-37474993.post-58525007114906392712008-03-26T23:25:00.002+01:002008-03-26T23:32:29.530+01:00"Discursive Dilemma"<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="" lang="EN-GB">Today at the LOGOS Colloquium, <a href="http://stephanhartmann.org/">Stephan Hartmann</a> discussed the so-called “discursive dilemma.” I was convinced by <a href="http://www.ub.es/grc_logos/people/marti/index.htm">Genoveva Martí</a> that it is not clear how to get a real dilemma from the examples. Suppose a hiring committee agrees to appoint a candidate if but only if s/he is strong </span><span style="" lang="EN-GB">both </span><span style="" lang="EN-GB">at research and at teaching. One third of them think s/he is, one other third think s/he is strong only at research, and the final third that s/he is strong only at teaching. It seems to me that a collective decision-making mechanism that allows the candidate to be hired in this situation is not the most reasonable one.<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="" lang="EN-GB">Pettit (<a href="http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/0029-4624.35.s1.11">2001</a>) seems to suggest that, were the candidate not to be hired, the group would suffer from a certain sort of deficiency in “collective rationality”, as the majority think the candidate is strong at research, and the majority think that s/he is strong at teaching. That is true, but it certainly does not follow that the majority think that s/he’s strong <i></span><span style="" lang="EN-GB">both</i> </span><span style="" lang="EN-GB">at research and at teaching—actually, the majority think s/he lacks one essential requirement to be appointable. Why should they hire the candidate??<o:p></o:p></span></p>Dan López de Sahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16716694655307652854noreply@blogger.com19tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-37474993.post-81798396458340278122008-03-02T00:06:00.010+01:002008-03-02T00:58:29.415+01:00MM Lowe and McCall: two incompatible requisites on sums-at-a-timeThe MM reading group has been reading a paper by Lowe and McCall: “The 3D/4D Controversy: A Storm in a Teacup”. I could not attend the session, but here is a worry that I have about the paper. (Warning: this posting is not self-contained and will not be intelligible for those who have not read the paper. I am sorry about that…)<br /><br />In order to get the desired result that the 3D and 4D views are equivalent, the authors need “sums-at-times” to satisfy two requisites: (a) sums-at-times are acceptable for endurantists, i.e. they are not additions to the endurantist ontology, they are nothing over and above the enduring particles that the endurantist already accepts (b) Sums-at-times are “timebound”, i.e. they exist at only one time. For any two different times t and t’ in which an object O exists, (O, t) is numerically distinct from (O, t'). (Because of problems with the blogger, I use brackets instead of > and < to represent sums-at-times...In my notation, (O, t)represents the sum of particles that constitute O at t). <br /><br />The second requisite is necessary for the translation scheme they propose to work. If sums-at-times are not timebound, then something is true of them that is not true of temporal parts (namely, that they exist or may exist at more than one time). This is why, I think, the authors hasten to emphasize that <br /><br /><blockquote>(O, t) [the sum of particles that constitute O at t] may be understood as a 3D object which exists only at time t and no other time. […] The upshot of this is that the intertranslatability of 3D and 4D descriptions rests ultimately upon entities which can be described indifferently as “instantaneous 4D temporal parts”, or “3D objects which exist at one time only”. (p. 574) </blockquote><br /><br />But in ensuring that sums-at-times satisfy (b), the authors compromise (a). Understood as entities that exist at only one time, sums-at-times <span style="font-style: italic;">are</span> genuine additions to the endurantist ontology. And this is so independently of how ontologically promiscuous the endurantist decides to be about other issues (i.e. whether she accepts coincidence, arbitrary composition, etc) while still being endurantist.<br /><br />Take an example. Suppose that there are two times t and t’ such that Tibbles does not change in its constituent particles from t to t’. Then the set of particles that constitute Tibbles at t is the same set that constitutes it at t’. However, given (b), (Tibbles, t) is not identical to (Tibbles, t’). They are two different entities, one existing only at t and the other only at t’. But why should the endurantist accept the existence of these two numerally distinct things, (Tibbles, t) and (Tibbles, t’)? She accepts the existence of Tibbles, the existence of times, and the existence of enduring particles that constitute Tibbles at different times. Let us assume that she will also accept the existence of <span style="font-style: italic;">sums</span> of these particles. So she will accept the existence of a sum of particles that constitute Tibbles at t, and a sum that constitutes Tibbles at t’. But why should she say that these are <span style="font-style: italic;">two numerically distinct things?</span> After all, they are composed of exactly the same enduring particles. Nothing in the endurantist’s position commits her with the existence of <span style="font-style: italic;">two</span> things here. In fact, the endurantist position can be understood precisely as the negation of the existence of two distinct things in a case like this. So understood, the endurantist view is that there are sums-at-times, but not as many as the perdurantist think there are. Notice that the endurantist can have this view even if she accepts unrestricted mereological composition. The existence of two different sums-at-times in the example above does not follow from accepting arbitrary composition. It would follow from accepting arbitrary <span style="font-style: italic;">d</span>ecomposition. But this is precisely the doctrine that the endurantist refuses to accept, and what makes her position non-equivalent to perdurantism. .</o,>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com13tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-37474993.post-22737016923936681912007-12-15T17:28:00.000+01:002007-12-16T11:02:56.043+01:00Against Causal Decision Theory?Too bad I missed last session of <a href="http://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/reading/reading15.htm">LOGOS RG on DT</a>, where people discussed <a href="http://www.sitemaker.umich.edu/egana/home">Andy</a> Egan's '<a href="http://www.geocities.com/eganamit/NoCDT.pdf">Some Counterexamples to Causal Decision Theory</a>'. Did anyone get why exactly CDT predicts that Paul should press the button?Dan López de Sahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16716694655307652854noreply@blogger.com20tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-37474993.post-21312019820883960462007-11-29T08:31:00.000+01:002007-11-29T08:36:19.877+01:00Limitations vs Generality Constraint?<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="" lang="EN-GB">If I understod it right, in the first part of <a href="http://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/people/toribio/">Pepa</a>’s yesterday <a href="http://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/firstsemester.htm">seminar</a> <a href="http://www.blogger.com/profile/13326054531943637158">Oscar</a> <a href="http://blogblogos.blogspot.com/2007/11/on-inference-relations-and-constituents.html">talks about</a> there was an argument from the limitation of discriminative powers of a given perceptual system of representation to the failure of generality constraint. I wasn’t clear however how the argument could succeed.<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="" lang="EN-GB">Suppose the pigeons discriminate between 40 pecks and 50 pecks but fail to discriminate between 48 pecks and 50 pecks, so that are able to think:<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="" lang="EN-GB"></span></p><blockquote><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="" lang="EN-GB">(1) 40 pecks is different from 50 pecks.<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="" lang="EN-GB">(2) 40 pecks is different from 48 pecks.<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="" lang="EN-GB"></span></p></blockquote><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="" lang="EN-GB">It seems true that due to the limits alluded to the pigeons can not think<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="" lang="EN-GB"><blockquote>(3) 48 pecks is different from 50 pecks</blockquote><o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><i><span style="" lang="EN-GB">as opposed to<o:p></o:p></span></i></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="" lang="EN-GB"><blockquote>(3#) 50 pecks is different from 50 pecks.</blockquote><o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="" lang="EN-GB">But in order for generality constraint to be put in jeopardy it seems one would need the lack of ability to think (3) (and thus (3#)) <span style="font-style: italic;">period</span>, and nothing about the limitation mentioned seems enough to substantiate this latter contention.<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="" lang="EN-GB">I might be misconstruing something in the situation, can anyone help?<o:p></o:p></span></p>Dan López de Sahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16716694655307652854noreply@blogger.com6tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-37474993.post-65843148398357509512007-11-28T18:57:00.000+01:002007-11-28T20:23:48.118+01:00On inference relations and constituents of representationsToday <a href="http://www.philosophy.ed.ac.uk/staff/toribio.html">Pepa Toribio</a> gave a thoughtful and dense talk on nonconceptualism, and the very beginning of it she told us that<br /><blockquote>"For to contentful mental states to be inferentially related, they ought to have at least one constituent in common"</blockquote>That puzzled me, because it seems easy to give examples of inferences in which none of the premises share a constituent with the conclusion. Take for example the inference from "b is red" to "There are non-blue things". The inference works because "red things are not blue" is analitically true (though not being logically true, or true in virtue of the sintax alone.) Does anyone else shares my feelings?Oscar Cabacohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13326054531943637158noreply@blogger.com5tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-37474993.post-5185353140895892972007-11-24T18:31:00.000+01:002007-11-24T18:33:32.135+01:00St. Petersburg Paradox -Where are you?<p style="margin-bottom: 0cm;">During our last sesion on Decision theory, we were discusing on St. Peterburg paradox. </p> <p style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><br /></p> <p style="margin-bottom: 0cm;">We, at least partially, agree that there is a paradox even if there is no infinite utilities. I will briefly defend that this position does not resist a simple mathematical analysis.</p> <p style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><br />On the asumption that there are no infinite utilities the St. Peterburg game is perfectly acceptable:<br />I would bet 2utilities for getting 2utilities if the coin lands heads and 4utilities if the second time that I flip the coin it lands heads again. The game seems to be completelly fair. And so are the following games where:<br /><br />The fist column represents the maximum price of the game. This would be 2utilities if the coin is flipped only once, 4 if it is flipped at most 2 times, and so on. In general 2 to the power of n where n is the number of times that the coin can as much be flipped.<br />The second represents the probability of each case.</p> <p style="margin-bottom: 0cm;">The third column represents the expected utility (how many utilities should I pay to play the game).</p> <p style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><br /></p> <p style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><script><!-- D(["mb","\n\n\n\n\t\n\t\n\t\n\t\n\t\n\t\n\n\u003ctable border\u003d\"1\" cellspacing\u003d\"0\" cols\u003d\"4\" frame\u003d\"void\" rules\u003d\"groups\"\>\n\t\u003ccolgroup\>\u003ccol width\u003d\"212\"\>\u003ccol width\u003d\"175\"\>\u003ccol width\u003d\"86\"\>\u003ccol width\u003d\"86\"\>\u003c/colgroup\>\n\t\u003ctbody\>\n\t\t\u003ctr\>\n\t\t\t\u003ctd align\u003d\"center\" height\u003d\"18\" width\u003d\"212\"\>Premium\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\t\u003ctd align\u003d\"center\" width\u003d\"175\"\>Probability %\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\t\u003ctd align\u003d\"center\" width\u003d\"86\"\>EU\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\t\u003ctd align\u003d\"center\" width\u003d\"86\"\>Result\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\u003c/tr\>\n\t\t\u003ctr\>\n\t\t\t\u003ctd align\u003d\"right\" height\u003d\"18\"\>0\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\t\u003ctd align\u003d\"right\"\>50,0000000000\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\t\u003ctd align\u003d\"right\"\>0\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\t\u003ctd align\u003d\"right\"\>-20\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\u003c/tr\>\n\t\t\u003ctr\>\n\t\t\t\u003ctd align\u003d\"right\" height\u003d\"18\"\>2\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\t\u003ctd align\u003d\"right\"\>50,0000000000\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\t\u003ctd align\u003d\"right\"\>1\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\t\u003ctd align\u003d\"right\"\>-18\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\u003c/tr\>\n\t\t\u003ctr\>\n\t\t\t\u003ctd align\u003d\"right\" height\u003d\"18\"\>4\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\t\u003ctd align\u003d\"right\"\>25,0000000000\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\t\u003ctd align\u003d\"right\"\>2\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\t\u003ctd align\u003d\"right\"\>-16\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\u003c/tr\>\n\t\t\u003ctr\>\n\t\t\t\u003ctd align\u003d\"right\" height\u003d\"18\"\>8\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\t\u003ctd align\u003d\"right\"\>12,5000000000\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\t\u003ctd align\u003d\"right\"\>3\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\t\u003ctd align\u003d\"right\"\>-12\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\u003c/tr\>\n\t\t\u003ctr\>\n\t\t\t\u003ctd align\u003d\"right\" height\u003d\"18\"\>16\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\t\u003ctd align\u003d\"right\"\>6,2500000000\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\t\u003ctd align\u003d\"right\"\>4\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\t\u003ctd align\u003d\"right\"\>-4\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\u003c/tr\>\n\t\t\u003ctr\>\n\t\t\t\u003ctd align\u003d\"right\" height\u003d\"18\"\>32\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\t\u003ctd align\u003d\"right\"\>3,1250000000\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\t\u003ctd align\u003d\"right\"\>5\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\t\u003ctd align\u003d\"right\"\>12\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\u003c/tr\>\n\t\t\u003ctr\>\n\t\t\t\u003ctd align\u003d\"right\" height\u003d\"18\"\>64\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\t\u003ctd align\u003d\"right\"\>1,5625000000\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\t\u003ctd align\u003d\"right\"\>6\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\t\u003ctd align\u003d\"right\"\>44\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\u003c/tr\>\n\t\t\u003ctr\>\n\t\t\t\u003ctd align\u003d\"right\" height\u003d\"18\"\>128\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\t\u003ctd align\u003d\"right\"\>0,7812500000\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\t\u003ctd align\u003d\"right\"\>7\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\t\u003ctd align\u003d\"right\"\>108\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\u003c/tr\>\n\t\t\u003ctr\>\n\t\t\t\u003ctd align\u003d\"right\" height\u003d\"18\"\>256\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\t\u003ctd align\u003d\"right\"\>0,3906250000\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\t\u003ctd align\u003d\"right\"\>8\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\t\u003ctd align\u003d\"right\"\>236\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\u003c/tr\>\n\t\t\u003ctr\>\n\t\t\t\u003ctd align\u003d\"right\" height\u003d\"18\"\>512\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\t\u003ctd align\u003d\"right\"\>0,1953125000\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\t\u003ctd align\u003d\"right\"\>9\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\t\u003ctd align\u003d\"right\"\>492\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\u003c/tr\>\n\t\t\u003ctr\>\n\t\t\t\u003ctd align\u003d\"right\" height\u003d\"18\"\>1024\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\t\u003ctd align\u003d\"right\"\>0,0976562500\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\t\u003ctd align\u003d\"right\"\>10\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\t",1] ); //--></script> <table border="1" cellspacing="0" cols="4" frame="void" rules="groups"> <colgroup><col width="212"><col width="175"><col width="86"><col width="86"></colgroup> <tbody> <tr> <td align="center" height="18" width="212">Premium</td> <td align="center" width="175">Probability %</td> <td align="center" width="86">EU</td> <td align="center" width="86">Result</td> </tr> <tr> <td align="right" height="18">0</td> <td align="right">50,0000000000</td> <td align="right">0</td> <td align="right">-20</td> </tr> <tr> <td align="right" height="18">2</td> <td align="right">50,0000000000</td> <td align="right">1</td> <td align="right">-18</td> </tr> <tr> <td align="right" height="18">4</td> <td align="right">25,0000000000</td> <td align="right">2</td> <td align="right">-16</td> </tr> <tr> <td align="right" height="18">8</td> <td align="right">12,5000000000</td> <td align="right">3</td> <td align="right">-12</td> </tr> <tr> <td align="right" height="18">16</td> <td align="right">6,2500000000</td> <td align="right">4</td> <td align="right">-4</td> </tr> <tr> <td align="right" height="18">32</td> <td align="right">3,1250000000</td> <td align="right">5</td> <td align="right">12</td> </tr> <tr> <td align="right" height="18">64</td> <td align="right">1,5625000000</td> <td align="right">6</td> <td align="right">44</td> </tr> <tr> <td align="right" height="18">128</td> <td align="right">0,7812500000</td> <td align="right">7</td> <td align="right">108</td> </tr> <tr> <td align="right" height="18">256</td> <td align="right">0,3906250000</td> <td align="right">8</td> <td align="right">236</td> </tr> <tr> <td align="right" height="18">512</td> <td align="right">0,1953125000</td> <td align="right">9</td> <td align="right">492</td> </tr> <tr> <td align="right" height="18">1024</td> <td align="right">0,0976562500</td> <td align="right">10</td> <script><!-- D(["mb","\u003ctd align\u003d\"right\"\>1004\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\u003c/tr\>\n\t\t\u003ctr\>\n\t\t\t\u003ctd align\u003d\"right\" height\u003d\"18\"\>2048\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\t\u003ctd align\u003d\"right\"\>0,0488281250\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\t\u003ctd align\u003d\"right\"\>11\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\t\u003ctd align\u003d\"right\"\>2028\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\u003c/tr\>\n\t\t\u003ctr\>\n\t\t\t\u003ctd align\u003d\"right\" height\u003d\"18\"\>4096\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\t\u003ctd align\u003d\"right\"\>0,0244140625\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\t\u003ctd align\u003d\"right\"\>12\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\t\u003ctd align\u003d\"right\"\>4076\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\u003c/tr\>\n\t\t\u003ctr\>\n\t\t\t\u003ctd align\u003d\"right\" height\u003d\"18\"\>8192\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\t\u003ctd align\u003d\"right\"\>0,0122070313\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\t\u003ctd align\u003d\"right\"\>13\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\t\u003ctd align\u003d\"right\"\>8172\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\u003c/tr\>\n\t\t\u003ctr\>\n\t\t\t\u003ctd align\u003d\"right\" height\u003d\"18\"\>16384\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\t\u003ctd align\u003d\"right\"\>0,0061035156\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\t\u003ctd align\u003d\"right\"\>14\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\t\u003ctd align\u003d\"right\"\>16364\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\u003c/tr\>\n\t\t\u003ctr\>\n\t\t\t\u003ctd align\u003d\"right\" height\u003d\"18\"\>32768\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\t\u003ctd align\u003d\"right\"\>0,0030517578\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\t\u003ctd align\u003d\"right\"\>15\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\t\u003ctd align\u003d\"right\"\>32748\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\u003c/tr\>\n\t\t\u003ctr\>\n\t\t\t\u003ctd align\u003d\"right\" height\u003d\"18\"\>65536\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\t\u003ctd align\u003d\"right\"\>0,0015258789\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\t\u003ctd align\u003d\"right\"\>16\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\t\u003ctd align\u003d\"right\"\>65516\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\u003c/tr\>\n\t\t\u003ctr\>\n\t\t\t\u003ctd align\u003d\"right\" height\u003d\"18\"\>131072\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\t\u003ctd align\u003d\"right\"\>0,0007629395\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\t\u003ctd align\u003d\"right\"\>17\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\t\u003ctd align\u003d\"right\"\>131052\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\u003c/tr\>\n\t\t\u003ctr\>\n\t\t\t\u003ctd align\u003d\"right\" height\u003d\"18\"\>262144\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\t\u003ctd align\u003d\"right\"\>0,0003814697\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\t\u003ctd align\u003d\"right\"\>18\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\t\u003ctd align\u003d\"right\"\>262124\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\u003c/tr\>\n\t\t\u003ctr\>\n\t\t\t\u003ctd align\u003d\"right\" height\u003d\"18\"\>524288\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\t\u003ctd align\u003d\"right\"\>0,0001907349\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\t\u003ctd align\u003d\"right\"\>19\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\t\u003ctd align\u003d\"right\"\>524268\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\u003c/tr\>\n\t\t\u003ctr\>\n\t\t\t\u003ctd align\u003d\"right\" height\u003d\"18\"\>1048576\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\t\u003ctd align\u003d\"right\"\>0,0000953674\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\t\u003ctd align\u003d\"right\"\>20\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\t\u003ctd align\u003d\"right\"\>1048556\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\u003c/tr\>\n\t\u003c/tbody\>\n\u003c/table\>\n\n\u003c/p\>\n\u003cp style\u003d\"margin-bottom:0cm\"\>\u003cbr\>\u003cbr\>\u003cbr\>\n\u003c/p\>\n\u003cp style\u003d\"margin-bottom:0cm\"\>\u003cbr\>\n\u003c/p\>\n\u003cp style\u003d\"margin-bottom:0cm\"\>For the example assumme that I have a \nlineal utility function regarding money between 0 and 1million euro\n(hard to believe but assumme that that is the case) and that the\nutility of 100M € equals the utility of 1M for me. The function\nsaturates at 1M. (if you are not convince, for 30€ you can earn up\nto 1billion €, and I think that that is enought to saturate\ndefinitely the utility function of all of us).",1] ); //--></script><td align="right">1004</td> </tr> <tr> <td align="right" height="18">2048</td> <td align="right">0,0488281250</td> <td align="right">11</td> <td align="right">2028</td> </tr> <tr> <td align="right" height="18">4096</td> <td align="right">0,0244140625</td> <td align="right">12</td> <td align="right">4076</td> </tr> <tr> <td align="right" height="18">8192</td> <td align="right">0,0122070313</td> <td align="right">13</td> <td align="right">8172</td> </tr> <tr> <td align="right" height="18">16384</td> <td align="right">0,0061035156</td> <td align="right">14</td> <td align="right">16364</td> </tr> <tr> <td align="right" height="18">32768</td> <td align="right">0,0030517578</td> <td align="right">15</td> <td align="right">32748</td> </tr> <tr> <td align="right" height="18">65536</td> <td align="right">0,0015258789</td> <td align="right">16</td> <td align="right">65516</td> </tr> <tr> <td align="right" height="18">131072</td> <td align="right">0,0007629395</td> <td align="right">17</td> <td align="right">131052</td> </tr> <tr> <td align="right" height="18">262144</td> <td align="right">0,0003814697</td> <td align="right">18</td> <td align="right">262124</td> </tr> <tr> <td align="right" height="18">524288</td> <td align="right">0,0001907349</td> <td align="right">19</td> <td align="right">524268</td> </tr> <tr> <td align="right" height="18">1048576</td> <td align="right">0,0000953674</td> <td align="right">20</td> <td align="right">1048556</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> </p> <p style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><br /><br /><br /></p> <p style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><br /></p> <p style="margin-bottom: 0cm;">For the example assumme that I have a lineal utility function regarding money between 0 and 1million euro (hard to believe but assumme that that is the case) and that the utility of 100M € equals the utility of 1M for me. The function saturates at 1M. (if you are not convince, for 30€ you can earn up to 1billion €, and I think that that is enought to saturate definitely the utility function of all of us).<script><!-- D(["mb","\u003cbr\>The fifth column\nshows the money I would earn or lose depending on the result of the\ngame.\u003cbr\>If you are having doubts on whether to play the game or not\nis because the utility of money is not linal for you and therefore:\nU(1M€) is not equal to 50000*U(20€). \n\u003c/p\>\n\u003cp style\u003d\"margin-bottom:0cm\"\>In this case you would pay less money\nto play the game, but this is completely compatible with decision\ntheory. Think of something wich utility is lineal in this range and\nyou accpet the game (psichological reasons to avoid betting are out\nof the question) as you clearly see when the game is propossed to win\njust 4€.\u003cbr\>The paradox is expressed in terms of utilities so have\nto find something which utility is lineal between 0 and 1M.\u003cbr\>\u003cbr\>The\nreal problem arises just in case we consider infinite utilities (no\nmatter whether they are lineal or not). Imagine that more money has\nalways a higher utility, so the utility function of money is a\nmonotonically strictly increasing function in any interval. Then\nthere is a problem, because at the limit the price is infinite...\u003cbr\>The\nexpected utility of any lottery involving an infinite price cost\ninfinite no matter what the probability is. This two lotteries has\nthe same cost (infinite):\u003c/p\>\n\u003ctable border\u003d\"0\" cellpadding\u003d\"2\" cellspacing\u003d\"0\" width\u003d\"100%\"\>\n\t\u003ccol width\u003d\"128*\"\>\n\t\u003ccol width\u003d\"128*\"\>\n\t\u003ctbody\>\u003ctr\>\n\t\t\u003ctd height\u003d\"19\" width\u003d\"50%\"\>\n\t\t\t\u003cp align\u003d\"right\"\>1,00%\u003c/p\>\n\t\t\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\u003ctd width\u003d\"50%\"\>\n\t\t\t\u003cp align\u003d\"right\"\>99,00%\u003c/p\>\n\t\t\u003c/td\>\n\t\u003c/tr\>\n\t\u003ctr\>\n\t\t\u003ctd height\u003d\"18\" width\u003d\"50%\"\>\n\t\t\t\u003cp align\u003d\"right\"\>0\u003c/p\>\n\t\t\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\u003ctd width\u003d\"50%\"\>\n\t\t\t\u003cp align\u003d\"right\"\>infinite\u003c/p\>\n\t\t\u003c/td\>\n\t\u003c/tr\>\n\t\u003ctr\>\n\t\t\u003ctd height\u003d\"18\" width\u003d\"50%\"\>\n\t\t\t\u003cp\>\u003cbr\>\n\t\t\t\u003c/p\>\n\t\t\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\u003ctd width\u003d\"50%\"\>\n\t\t\t\u003cp\>\u003cbr\>\n\t\t\t\u003c/p\>\n\t\t\u003c/td\>\n\t\u003c/tr\>\n\t\u003ctr\>\n\t\t\u003ctd height\u003d\"18\" width\u003d\"50%\"\>\n\t\t\t\u003cp align\u003d\"right\"\>99,99%\u003c/p\>\n\t\t\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\u003ctd width\u003d\"50%\"\>\n\t\t\t\u003cp align\u003d\"right\"\>0,01%\u003c/p\>\n\t\t\u003c/td\>\n\t\u003c/tr\>\n\t\u003ctr\>\n\t\t\u003ctd height\u003d\"19\" width\u003d\"50%\"\>\n\t\t\t\u003cp align\u003d\"right\"\>0\u003c/p\>\n\t\t\u003c/td\>\n\t\t\u003ctd width\u003d\"50%\"\>\n\t\t\t\u003cp align\u003d\"right\"\>infinite\u003c/p\>\n\t\t\u003c/td\>\n\t\u003c/tr\>\n\u003c/tbody\>\u003c/table\>\n\u003cp\>",1] ); //--></script><br />The fouth column shows the money I would win or lose depending on the result of the game.<br />If you are having doubts on whether to play the game or not is because the utility of money is not linal for you and therefore: U(1M€) is not equal to 50000*U(20€). </p> <p style="margin-bottom: 0cm;">In this case you would pay less money to play the game, but this is completely compatible with decision theory. Think of something wich utility is lineal in this range and you accpet the game (psichological reasons to avoid betting are out of the question) as you clearly see when the game is propossed to win just 4€.<br />The paradox is expressed in terms of utilities so have to find something which utility is lineal between 0 and 1M.<br /><br />The real problem arises just in case we consider infinite utilities (no matter whether they are lineal or not). Imagine that more money has always a higher utility, so the utility function of money is a monotonically strictly increasing function in any interval. Then there is a problem, because at the limit the price is infinite...<br />The expected utility of any lottery involving an infinite price cost infinite no matter what the probability is. This two lotteries has the same cost (infinite):</p> <table border="0" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0" width="100%"> <col width="128*"> <col width="128*"> <tbody><tr> <td height="19" width="50%"> <p align="right">1,00%</p> </td> <td width="50%"> <p align="right">99,00%</p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td height="18" width="50%"> <p align="right">0</p> </td> <td width="50%"> <p align="right">infinite</p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td height="18" width="50%"> <p><br /> </p> </td> <td width="50%"> <p><br /> </p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td height="18" width="50%"> <p align="right">99,99%</p> </td> <td width="50%"> <p align="right">0,01%</p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td height="19" width="50%"> <p align="right">0</p> </td> <td width="50%"> <p align="right">infinite</p> </td> </tr> </tbody></table> <p><script><!-- D(["mb","You should prefer the second lottery to all that you have and that\nis obviously unacceptable. The solution: there are not infinite\nutilities.\u003cbr\>\u003cbr\>\u003cbr\>\n\u003c/p\>\n\u003cp\>The problem with lower probabilities is just that we are not able\nto find any utility that satisfies that lottery and therefore it is\ndifficult to find an interpretation of paying 250 utilities to play\nthis lottery.\u003c/p\>\u003cp\>99,99%->0\u003c/p\>\u003cp\>0,01%->25000000\u003cbr\>\n\u003c/p\>\n\u003cp\>But that says absolutely nothing against the decision theory. \u003cbr\>\u003c/p\>\u003cp\>The\nSt. Petersburg game is only a problematic if we consider infinite\nutilities.\u003c/p\>\n",0] ); D(["mi",8,2,"11672a2bc067202d",0,"0","Dan López de Sa","Dan","dlopezdesa@gmail.com",[[] ,[["usuario","msebastian@gmail.com","11672a2bc067202d"] ] ,[] ] ,"18:09 (hace 4 minutos)",["Sebastian miguel \u003cmsebastian@gmail.com\>"] ,[] ,[] ,[] ,"24-nov-2007 18:09","Re: St. Peterburg paradox where are you?","",[] ,1,,,"24 de noviembre de 2007_18:09","2007/11/24, Dan López de Sa \u003cdlopezdesa@gmail.com\>:","2007/11/24, Dan López de Sa <dlopezdesa@gmail.com>:","gmail.com",,,"","",0,,"\u003c82c8581e0711240909q69ca03aar1241fa251115dcb8@mail.gmail.com\>",0,,0,"En respuesta a \"St. Peterburg paradox where are you?\"",0] ); D(["mb","Gracias.Ahora se ve el blogos con tamaño de letra más peque´ñon, nbo? Sabes por qué?\u003d",1] ); //--></script>You should prefer the second lottery to all that you have and that is obviously unacceptable. The solution: there are not infinite utilities.<br /><br /><br /></p> <p>The problem with lower probabilities is just that we are not able to find any utility that satisfies that lottery and therefore it is difficult to find an interpretation of paying 250 utilities to play this lottery.</p><p>99,99%->0</p><p>0,01%->25000000<br /></p> <p>But that says absolutely nothing against the decision theory.<br /></p><p>The St. Petersburg game is only a problematic if we consider infinite utilities.</p>Sebashttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12920155887988013802noreply@blogger.com8tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-37474993.post-46878847785564833952007-11-23T16:54:00.000+01:002007-11-23T17:12:52.438+01:00C&R Zeman: A Closet Contextualist?<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="" lang="EN-GB"><o:p> </o:p></span></p><span style="" lang="EN-GB">According to </span><span style="" lang="EN-GB"> <a href="http://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=%27Index,+Context,+and+Content%27+%281980%29&hl=en&client=firefox-a&rls=org.mozilla:en-GB:official&hs=GLD&um=1&oi=scholart">David Lewis (1980)</a></span><span style="" lang="EN-GB">, a <i style="">context</i> is a location (spatiotemporally</span><span style="" lang="EN-US"> centered</span> world) where a sentence may be said (but need not contain any utterance nor speaker at the center etc.), and thus has countless features, and an index is an n-tuple of shiftable features of context. Moderate views have it that a sentence s is true at a context c iff s is true at c with respect to the index of that context i_c; and radical relativist views such as MacFarlane's depart from that.<br /><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="" lang="EN-GB">With respect to this framework, one can characterize <i>contextualist</i> versions of moderate relativism endorsing the appearances of sentence s being true at c (wrt i_c) while false at c* (wrt i_c*); and in turn one can distinguish <i>indexical contextualism</i> (having it that this is true in virtue of s having a different content at c than c*) from <i>non-indexical contextualism</i> (having it that s has the same content at c and c* but that determines a different value wrt i_c than wrt i_c*.<br /><!--[endif]--><o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="" lang="EN-GB">Contexts in this sense are very rich. In particular, there is nothing as <b style=""><i style="">the</i></b> epistemic situation (or standard or whathaveyou) <b style=""><i style="">of</i></b> the context. There is that of the speaker at the center of the context (if one), that of the attributee of the utterance at the center of the context (if one), that which is salient in the conversation that takes place near the center of the context (if one), and so on and so forth. As <a href="http://www.ub.es/grc_logos/people/zeman/index.htm">Dan</a> Z points out, this richness of contexts tends to be neglected in some discussions about knowledge attributions, and more sophisticated versions of indexical contextualism would presumably exploit this. (He still thinks that the view suffers from other “quite serious” difficulties so that it is “likely” that it will fail. I’m not convinced, but let’s discuss that in some other occasion.)<br /><br />As I understand his own positive proposal, he claims that the attributions have the same semantic value across context, but are evaluated differently with respect to different indices of these context—where the epistemic standard of the context that figures as a coordinate in the index need not be that of the subject at the center of the context, nor the attributee, but is the highest (I guess among those that are relevant in the conversation that takes place near the center). But thus his seems to me to be a version of non-indexical contextualism and not radical relativism proper!</span></p>Dan López de Sahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16716694655307652854noreply@blogger.com7tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-37474993.post-66074505968286927122007-11-21T22:15:00.000+01:002007-11-21T23:00:15.121+01:00Ways of Doing Otherwise?<span style="" lang="EN-GB">Today, at the <a href="http://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/colloquium.htm">LOGOS Colloquium</a>, Carlos Moya (València) presented his views on how to defend the principle of of alternate possibilities (PAP) from Frankfurt-like cases, which he published as chapter 2 of his <a href="http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title%7Econtent=t754739758%7Edb=book">Moral Responsability</a> (Routledge 2006).<br /><br />In a nutshell, and if I didn't misunderstand his presentation (I haven't read the chapter), the main idea was the following one. John's being responsible for murdering Smith doesn't contradict PAP, for John could have done otherwise after all: he could have merely involuntarily killed Smith.<br /><br />(Carlos originally stated this in terms of <span style="font-style: italic;">unintentionally </span>killing<span style="font-style: italic;"> </span>Smith, but as issued in discussion with <a href="http://www3.udg.edu/fllff/pradesjl.htm">Prades</a>, the notion of <span style="font-style: italic;">intentional action</span> in place cannot be merely that of action appropriately caused by beliefs/desires, and Carlos replied he was happy rephrase it in terms of (in)voluntary action.)<br /><br />I worried, in connection with <a href="http://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/people/diez/index.htm">Jose</a>'s, that this seemed to be dangerously close to the following (unsatisfactory, I take it) general way of dispelling any possible counterexample to PAP: if the agent is responsible, s/he could always have done otherwise, for s/he could always have done the "corresponding" thing <span style="font-style: italic;">without being responsible. </span>It was hard for me to see how the sense in which the act of murdering and the act of involuntary killing someone (in the Frankfurt situation) were "different actions" could fail to vindicate that same sense in the latter, trivializing case.<br /></span><span style="" lang="EN-GB"></span>Dan López de Sahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16716694655307652854noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-37474993.post-67363783249066238182007-11-15T12:43:00.000+01:002007-11-15T12:48:28.045+01:00Imagining Scientific Models?<span style="" lang="EN-GB">Yesterday, at the <a href="http://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/firstsemester.htm">LOGOS Seminar</a>, <a href="http://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/people/rosenkranz/index.htm"><span style="color: windowtext; text-decoration: none;"></span></a><a href="http://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/people/frigg/index.htm">Roman</a> presented his views on scientific models (see also <a href="http://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/people.htm">Manolo</a> M’s <a href="http://blogblogos.blogspot.com/2007/11/roman-on-fiction-and-models.html">discussion</a>).<o:p> </o:p></span> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="" lang="EN-GB">I was very sympathetic to Roman’s contention that “going fictionalist” in debates in metaphysics or the philosophy of mathematics of the philosophy of science need not help much—unless, of course, one has an illuminating general theory on fictions, and is in a position to substantiate the claim that the problematic entities are indeed fictions, in the sense of the theory. <o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="" lang="EN-GB">This was indeed the aim of Roman’s paper, dwelling upon the “pretense theory.” As he himself acknowledged, there might be general problems with the view—what if the key normative notions employed ultimately make no sense—and specific problems with the intended application to scientific models—what if the sensible generation principles are relatively trivial, and the only truths in fiction are very close to the surface?—. In particular, I worried that there seemed to be a crucial disanalogy between literary works and descriptions of scientific models: although talk about <i>imagination</i> makes perfectly good sense in the former case, it seems to be at best metaphorical in the latter. As Roman seemed to agree in discussion, the relevant kind of act seems to be more that of <i>considering</i></span><span style="" lang="EN-GB">—</span><span style="" lang="EN-GB">as opposed to <i>imagining</i>, I would say. But then the worry was that the contrast with the alternative so-called “formal” approaches turn out to be much less clear after all, as also pointed out by <a href="http://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/people/diez/index.htm">Jose</a>.<o:p></o:p></span></p>Dan López de Sahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16716694655307652854noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-37474993.post-44761180181952787812007-11-15T10:22:00.000+01:002007-11-15T11:04:38.346+01:00Roman on fiction and modelsIn yesterday's session of the Logos Seminar, <a href="http://www.ub.es/grc_logos/people/frigg/index.htm">Roman Frigg</a> made the interesting suggestion that scientific models -such as ball-and-stick molecular models or simple pendula, with their massless strings and their point masses- should be understood as being similar in kind to literary fictions -such as Sherlock Holmes or Godzilla. Furthermore, he proposed that the best treatment for these is one along the lines of Walton's acts of make-believe.<br />I had doubts about one of the arguments he presented for treating models as fictions:<br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">(The Semantic Argument) </span>The simple pendulum equations are not true of anything -they would only apply to pendula with a massless string and a point mass, shielded from all forces but a uniform gravitational field, or something like that. Therefore, between the equations and real pendula we must postulate an imaginary something -a scientific model- to which the equations would faithfully applied, if it existed.<br /><br />In fact, Roman's aim for the talk was to consider the relation between ourselves and the scientific model -relation he spelled out in terms of acts of make-believe- and not the relation between model and world.<br /><br />But I would have said there is another option to deal with the lack of conformity between the simple pendulum equation and real pendula: the relevant singular terms in the equations do really refer to pendula; it is just that the equations misrepresent them. Actually, they don't misrepresent them <span style="font-style: italic;">that</span> much; this is why the equations are useful. Wouldn't this get rid of models-as-fictions in the case of pendula?<br />A way to drive this point home, maybe, is to consider a history book in which several things are said about World War II, some of which are false: that Spain sent troops to Germany, maybe. Couldn't we mount an analogue to the Semantic Argument above to the effect that there is a fictional war involved in our understanding of the text?<br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">(The Semantic Argument - WWII version) </span>The sentences in the history book are not true of anything -they would only apply to a war in which Spain did send troops to Germany. Therefore, between the book and the real war we must postulate an imaginary something -a fictional war- to which the sentences would faithfully applied, if it existed.<br /><br />But we feel no temptation to postulate such a fictional war: it is just that the book misrepresents WWII.<br /><br />Another question in this connection: does it follow, if Roman is right, that there is a fictional model between ball-and-stick molecular mock-ups and real molecules, one in which atoms are spherical and rigidly bonded to one another? I'm not sure that it follows, but if it does, that is surely less natural than simply say that such a ball-and-stick mock-up truly represents the molecule of, say, cyclohexane, just like a map of the London Tube truly represents the London Tube.Manolo Martínezhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09403052618689090551noreply@blogger.com0