Hi all,
I have a doubt I would like to discuss:
Sider says that 'whether multiple candidate meanings for talk of personal identity exist, and what they are like , depend on what the true ontology of persistence turns out to be'. I know this is an example but I guess Sider would say the same for the other cases.
So, in Sider's view, the true ontology of persistence (of persons, too) determines whether multiple candidate meanings for 'person' exist and what they are like.
But, on the other hand, one would say that what the true ontology of persistence (of persons, too) is depends on our semantic intuitions about, for example, persons, or, at least, that to respect these intutions is a point in favour of competing theories.
But then the position seems to be quite unstable.
What do you think about that?
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3 comments:
I guess that in the sense of 'true ontology of persistence' in which the first remark is true, the second is at best potentially misleading: it is the correct analysis of 'person' which depends on people's semantic intuitions and the like, no?
Yes, but I wondered if this (at least helps to) determine the true ontology of (persons's) persistence.
I guess not, in the relevant sense of 'true ontology' in which the first remark holds, no?
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